The model I am suggesting has two components: the motivations and the means of actors in the decision-making process (see figure one). On the first level, motivations are determined by the intersection of theories based on rationality and psychology. On the second level, the means of fulfilling these motivations are determined by two-level game playing, a theory developed by Robert Putnam. Thus, when a decision is reached by two political entities, each starts by individually experiencing rational and psychological forces that affect their perspectives. These forces can vary in relative weight and eventually create some desire or motivation. When these individuals have different motivations, they next engage in two-level game playing. In this process, both actors have stated minimum outcomes and real minimum outcomes derived from the rational and psychological forces that initially shaped each actor’s motivations. The resulting policy decision comes from the intersection of these factors.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The first case study I will use to develop this theory is the Cuban Missile Crisis. I will apply the three levels of analysis in this theory to the two primary actors in the Crisis: John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev (see figure one).
Three significant rational factors motivated Nikita Khrushchev to move missiles into Cuba. First was the Berlin crisis. Having issued several ultimatums to the West to remove troops from the country by specific deadlines (that had since past), Khrushchev needed a way to pressure the United States. The second and probably most critical rational force pressuring Khrushchev was weapons buildup and proximity. With the United States easily leading the arms race (Merrill and Paterson 382) and, more importantly, a stock-pile of weapons in nearby Turkey, Russia could not uphold mutually assured deterrence. Finally, domestic problems in Russia were also a factor. By 1992, Khrushchev had suffered substantial political setbacks because of his failure to increase food production, raise state-controlled food prices and reduce military spending (May and Zelikow 417).
The psychological factors that motivated Khrushchev were equally significant in his decision. The first of these was a need to respond to the perception that the U.S. was acting “’particularly arrogant’ about its nuclear deterrence abilities” (May and Zelikow 421). Moreover, the Bay of Pigs gave Khrushchev the motivation to move his missiles. First, he himself expressed to Kennedy that he was “very grieved” (Merrill and Paterson 403) by the incident – while reminding the President of his admission that the event was a mistake. Moreover, in the same document, Khrushchev tells Kennedy he is helping Cuba because it was a backward country dealing with the aftermath of a revolution (Merrill and Paterson 403). Clearly, this psychological dimension certainly cannot be underestimated and had a crucial role for Khrushchev.
President Kennedy also experienced rational and psychological forces. On the rational level, there are two forces of importance. The first was the failure at the Bay of Pigs. As at least one catalyst for the Russia decision, the event certainly played into Kennedy’s thought processes. Resulting in many Cuban deaths and causing serious public embarrassment, the event set the tone for tension with Cuba. The second major rational force that Kennedy experienced was obvious: the threat of Russian weapons in close proximity. The timing of the Russian move during the Cold War sent both unspoken and obvious messages to Kennedy’s administration. Moreover, Khrushchev made clear the military power of his country in a letter to the President, “you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries could dispose” (Merrill and Paterson 403). The tone of such messages meant the Kennedy administration had to take seriously weapons in close proximity like those in Cuba. Thus, the Bay of Pigs incident and the looming danger of nuclear military engagement made real the rational factors that shaped Kennedy’s choices.
Three psychological factors were at play in Kennedy. The first was Berlin, which was similarly a major concern for Russia. Apparently, the difficult situation in Germany was a serious impediment to Kennedy; it even “constrained his freedom of action at every turn” (May and Zelikow 422). This seems reasonable given Khrushchev’s desire to use the weapons in Cuba as a bargaining tool for Berlin. The second important psychological factor was a strong sensitivity toward Russian leaders’ attitudes and decisions. It almost seems as though Kennedy and key decision-makers were walking on eggshells. While dealing with the crisis, new pieces of information could often radically change how the decision-making circle perceived the problem – even on a “minute by minute” basis (May and Zelikow 423). The final psychological factor involved the redevelopment of Kennedy’s role as a decision-maker. Specifically, the Bay of Pigs represented a turning point in Kennedy’s style. Before, he involved few advisers and often made decisions quickly. The new Kennedy was the polar opposite; he assembled a large circle of influential and diverse advisers (May and Zelikow 416). As with Khrushchev, these psychological factors were all underpinned by the growing problem of nuclear deterrence and the component of ego that it often involves.
The result of the rational and psychological factors in each leader is a set of requirements priming them for two-level game playing. These requirements include a stated minimum outcome and a true minimum outcome. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev decided to make the somewhat risky move of sending missiles to Russia, with the intention of eventually offering an ultimatum on the Berlin crisis (May and Zelikow 422). When Kennedy discovered these missiles, he had ships surround Cuba which led to the two-level games that would then characterize the situation. For Khrushchev, his ultimate goal of using the missiles as a catch-all to fix Berlin, protect Cuba and deter the U.S. was marred by his stated minimum outcome. This consisted of an October 26, 1962 request that the U.S. not invade Cuba or support forces which would invade Cuba (Merrill and Paterson 404). To some extent, Khrushchev revealed his true minimum outcome the next day when he offered to remove missiles from Cuba in return for the U.S.’s removal of weapons from Turkey. Given the rational and psychological forces at play, this kind of bargaining is typical. Kennedy engages in similar negotiations. Obviously, his best outcome is to see Russia promptly move out of Cuba. His stated minimum outcome is derived from his initial response to Russia’s missiles: he created a blockade around Cuba and perceived the issue as a nuclear threat. Upon negotiating with Khrushchev and seeing the characteristics of the problem, it appears that his true minimum outcome is what Russia gets: weapons removed from Turkey and a commitment to not attack Cuba. The letters that are exchanged back and forth between these leaders reveal the two-level game playing process in which they engaged.
With the three theoretic components in mind, the Cuban Missile Crisis seems to easily fit within the combined model of foreign policy. Psychological factors such as nuclear deterrence, problems in Berlin and decision-making style changes combine with rational factors such as physical threats and domestic political problems to create an intense two-level game playing process between Kennedy and Khrushchev.
Missile Strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan
The situation in Afghanistan and Sudan at the time of the cruise missile strikes is typically used as an example of Irving Janis’s theory on Groupthink. Even so, a combined model of foreign policy is equally effective in characterizing the decisionmaking process. In this study, the first actor is President Clinton and the second is generally categorized as those who oppose Clinton (see figure two).
There were several rational factors that motivated Clinton. First, the President had received information that their target, bin Laden, would be meeting at a place that could be later attacked. This piece of information was especially pressing because it arrived within a few days of the meeting. Further, specific information was available that indicated to Clinton that the factory that would eventually be hit “had [been] linked to bin Laden’s network” (Russell 5). After the attacks, Clinton himself outlined several reasons for the attack, including bin Laden’s history of terrorism, evidence that linked him to the embassy attacks and his seeking chemical weapons (Hendrickson). Finally, Clinton also indicated that bin Laden was planning another “lethal attack” (Russell 7) against the U.S. These rational factors seem to indicate a rational basis – from Clinton’s perspective – for the attacks that would follow.
Those against Clinton also had rational bases for their position. These principally stemmed from a desire for the President to be more careful in his decision-making process. For example, Attorney General Reno wanted to give the FBI more time to get evidence and further connect the target list to bin Laden (Russell 5). Even National Security Council staff members indicated a similar kind of resistance (Russell 5). Apparently, these reservations were well-founded since persuasive documents later suggested that more evidence was necessary and further links to the factory needed to have been established.
Psychological factors played a significant role in the decision-making process. For Clinton, there were three such forces. First, on a domestic level, Clinton’s problems in the Monica Lewinsky scandal led many to believe that he was using bin Laden as a way to distract from the controversy. Indeed, Clinton’s admission of his inappropriate relationship aired just three days before he ordered the strike. Second, on an international level, Clinton experienced pressure to act decisively in sending a message. Advisers indicated that the response operation was “to show that the U.S. could hit back against an adversary who had bombed American embassies simultaneously in two countries” (Russell 6). Finally, Clinton was in the process of becoming a decisive leader less in need of an interplay of ideas. Some even described the new perspective as uncharacteristic. Taken together, these psychological elements made Clinton’s support for attacks seem obvious.
Those against Clinton also had an element of psychology affecting their perspective. First, in a some sense, many who criticized the President (including the Attorney General) felt that the U.S. should not exacerbate its impression as a hegemon against aspiring countries. Certainly, an attack on Afghanistan with a questionable basis would propagate such a view. Moreover, the significant sense that Clinton was using bin Laden to distract from Lewinsky permeated most levels of criticism – Dan Coats of the Senate Armed Services Committee subtlety referred to the scandal when he told reporters he was “greatly concerned about Clinton’s motivations for the strikes” (Russell 9).
This case study requires a special addition to the model because Clinton actively suppressed the views of those who opposed him during the discussion process. He created unanimity by only engaging issues of intelligence with a select group of eight advisers. Moreover, these advisers were instructed to not brief those closest to them – spawning isolation from policy differences. A State Department report that would argue the bombings were not justified was even hidden. In sum, dissension from the Attorney General, National Security Council staff members, Director of Central Intelligence and other key administration officials was unsolicited and ignored in deliberation on the eventual attack. This meant that those against Clinton had very little say in the two-level games portion of the model.
Even so, two-level games were still at work in the decision to attack Afghanistan. Both Clinton and his dissenters had very clear best outcomes. Clinton was interested in an attack on both Sudan and Afghanistan. His dissenters, on the other hand, would have preferred to wait or not attack at all. Even though a formal give-and-take between the two camps did not obviously occur, the process is still easily characterized by bargaining. Clinton’s original intention to attack two sites was sidestepped at the last minute when he received convincing and dissenting recommendations to stop the attack short of Sudan. This compromise is the best available representation of his actual minimum outcome. His stated winning outcome was the same as his best: two attacks. Those who opposed Clinton had a stated minimum outcome of no attacks. Thus, despite its imprecision, two-level games can still be applied to this decision-making process.
With the psychological, rational and two level games models in mind, the combined theory applied to the Afghanistan and Sudan missile strikes gives valuable insight into the theory’s weaknesses and how it can be applied. Psychological factors such as the Monica Lewinsky scandal, rational factors like lacking evidence and pervasive reports interacted in a suppressed (yet present) two level games decision-making process.
Summary
All theories of foreign policy have inherent limitations. Certainly this combined model has significant weaknesses. Even so, the pervasiveness of a model that combines rational, psychological and two level games models seems clear. With respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the model seemed to account for the major components of the decision- making process. Even the Groupthink case of the missiles in Afghanistan and Sudan could be characterized by the combined model with certain limitations. Of course, the model presented here is not exhaustive or even thoroughly explained – it is merely a suggestion of a holistic approach to thinking of foreign policy. By continuously reevaluating, suggesting augmentations and criticizing flaws in all models of foreign policy, we can work to better understand and characterize the decision-making processes at work today.
Taylor Valore is a senior computer science and international relations major from Rocky River, Ohio.
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Works Cited
Hendrickson, Ryan C. “The Clinton Administration’s Strikes on Usama Bin Laden: Limits to Power.” Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy. Ed. Ralph G. Carter. CQ Press. Washington, D.C., 2000.
May, Ernest R. and Zelikow, Philip D. “Kennedy’s Controlled Response to Khrrushchev’s Cuban Gamble.” Major Porlbmes in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914. Ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson. Boston, Massachusetts. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
Merrill, Dennis and Paterson, Thomas G. “Premier Nikita Khrushchev Asks for a U.S. No-Invasion Pledge, October 26, 1962.” Major Porlbmes in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914. Ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson. Boston, Massachusetts. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
Merrill, Dennis and Paterson, Thomas G. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914. Boston, Massachusetts. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
Russell, Richard L. “American Military Retaliation for Terrorism: Judging the Merits of the 1998 Cruise Missile Strikes in Afghanistan