The Lens Magazine : Winter 2006 : Foreign Food Aid to Bangladesh

Foreign Food Aid to Bangladesh

By Hibah Hussain

Bangladesh’s sky-high starvation rates make it obvious that the current food aid system is not working. Instead of withdrawing aid completely, the international community should shift its focus from bilateral government food aid to general aid for grassroots NGOs like the Grameen Bank.

For most people surrounded by the satiating comfort of the Western world, the hunger and desperation which plagues lesser developed countries like Bangladesh is baffling and unsettling. The Western response to this hunger, stemming from a sense of duty as well as a desire for influence, blossomed into an enormous government- to-government food aid program. Unfortunately, most of the international aid which pours into Bangladesh does not effectively in stimulate development or alleviate hunger. On the contrary, it creates a slew of problems and “benefits few people except the ruling classes” (Majewski, 1987). Given Bangladesh’s heavy reliance on foreign aid (more than $30 billion dollars have poured in since 1971 [EIA, 2004]), a complete cessation of aid would devastate the nation. However, Bangladesh’s sky-high starvation rates obviously indicate that the current food aid system is not working. Instead of withdrawing aid completely, the international community should shift its focus from bilateral government food aid to general aid for grassroots NGOs like the Grameen Bank.

Given its rich, arable land and bustling inland fisheries, Bangladesh’s intense malnutrition is puzzling. Many argue that the problem is with the system rather than with the resources or the cultivators. Not surprisingly, the bulk of food aid given to the Bangladeshi government gets soaked up by the “pervasive corruption of the bureaucrats and contractors” (Banglapedia, 2005). As Michael Scott, former director of Oxfam-America, so bluntly put it, “food aid is not intended for the poor people” (Scott, 1979). Instead, the money feeds the urban middle class, especially the police force and the army. In the words of British economist Peter Bauer, foreign aid serves merely to “transfer money from poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor countries” (Rahn, 2003).

By feeding the army rather than nourishing the poor, food aid given to the government is both wasteful and harmful. Instead of increasing security, the Bangladeshi military primarily suppresses dissent in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) area, often violating basic human rights in the process. The Jumma minority in the CHT area has repeatedly implored the international community to cease food aid to the Bangladeshi government, claiming that due to this aid, military oppression continues (Angel Fire.com, 2005). On top of this, the growing strength of the military increases the “dependency on aid for weapons, training facilities, oil, and spare parts” (Scott, 1979).

This self-perpetuating dependency provides one of the most potent arguments against the international food aid system. Even Bangladeshi finance minister Saifur Rahman acknowledged that the state’s “mental dependence on the donors... [needs to be changed] in the interest of the country” (BBC News, 2002). Many theorists claim that food aid is the opiate of the Third World (Majewski, 1987), allowing leaders to get by without having to address the real issues. As analyst John Majewski explains, “it is easier to order a shipment of food through the embassy than to spend time and money on a domestic procurement program” (Majewski, 1987). Along with discouraging production, this dependency leaves Bangladesh completely open and malleable to foreign interests. Although most citizens in developed countries view food aid as purely humanitarian, many politicians and theorists stress the “value of molding domestic policy in the recipient countries” (Shah, 1998). This concept of “using food aid as an arm of foreign policy objectives” does not help anyone but the elites of the donor and recipient countries (Shah, 1998).

Furthermore, direct food aid hurts the agricultural base which forms the backbone of the Bangladeshi economy. Developed countries often use lesser developed countries as a “dumping ground” for excess food (Brazier, 2001). Instead of feeding the hungry, these enormous infusions of foreign food serve merely to depress prices of homegrown agricultural products and suspend production. By providing the urban middle-class with government subsidized food, food aid programs eliminate an entire group of potential consumers of homegrown products sold by hard-working Bangladeshi peasants. By pushing crop prices to artificially low levels, food aid programs strip Bangladeshi peasants of livelihood, incentives and opportunities.

Although it is clear that long-term food aid is not a means to create growth (Bandow, 1998), an abrupt termination of aid would only lead to catastrophe. Born from the ashes of sweeping genocide and civil war, foreign aid propelled the development of Bangladesh as a country. As Chris Brazier notes in The New Internationalist, food aid has kept “hundreds and thousands of people alive in Bangladesh” (Brazier, 2001). Many experts, disillusioned with the government’s ineffective administering of aid, view NGOs as the “other path to development” (Jahan, 2001). NGOs can take more direct action than government systems, which are entrenched in bureaucracy and hidden motives.

The status quo has made it clear that hunger cannot be ameliorated by government food transfer alone. Rather, it “depends heavily on appropriate policies, functioning institutions, and cohesive societies,” all of which NGOs aim to create (Bandow, 1998). By working at the grassroots level, NGOs are closer to the people who need aid the most. They bring financial services to the doorsteps of the poor, providing them with the food and resources they so desperately need (Banglapedia, 2005). Their blend of organization and humanity helps NGOs “speak on the behalf of the community,” standing up for the rights of the neediest people (Jahan, 2001).

The increasing amount of food aid being funneled through NGOs is still miniscule compared with the amount of aid soaked up by the government, and yet recent estimates indicate that NGOs function in almost 80 percent of Bangladeshi villages. By slowly shifting aid efforts to these NGOs, the international community could improve the “capacity of the NGOs to design poverty alleviating programs” and enhance their ability to effectively utilize funds (Center for Policy Dialogue Bangladesh, 2003). Indigenous Bangladeshi NGOs are celebrated for their innovation and ability to work and empathize with the local people. Bangladeshi organizations such as the Grameen Bank and Proshika have substantially reduced poverty and hunger by giving resources directly to the people. Although the Grameen Bank’s vision of a “world free from poverty and hunger” may seem lofty, it has already helped 54 percent of its borrowers cross the poverty line and become self-sufficient (Srinivas, 2004). Despite all of their merits, NGOs are far from infallible. In order for NGOs to work effectively and reduce hunger, it is crucial for them to be vigilant and self-critical. After all, excessive dependence on foreign aid would put NGOs in the same precarious position that the government currently occupies. Although most NGO workers are driven by ideology and goodwill, some view the NGO sector as a means to “benefit personally in the name of development and poverty alleviation” (One World. com, 2005). Furthermore, good intentions do not always produce favorable results; NGOs should “never be given a permanent license as ‘good guys’” (Brazier, 2001). Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut way to help Bangladesh’s starving masses. Although foreign food aid seems like a logical solution, most of the money never makes its way out of urban officials’ sticky fingers and down to the people tilling the fields. Through its endless bureaucracy and power politics, the present system of foreign food aid is “strengthening the institutions which prevent progress while weakening the institutions which could bring true prosperity” (Majewski, 1987). Nevertheless, the international community should take care not to cut all lines with the Bangladeshi government. Despite its corruption and inefficacy, the state ultimately controls the domestic policies and infrastructure which are key to any lasting change. Shifting more aid to NGOs could be a wake up call to the government that would force officials to reconsider their unmotivated and self-serving policies.

Hibah Hussain is a sophomore from Wichita, Kansas.

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Works Cited

1 “Bad time ahead for Bangladesh.” BBC News. 29 April 2002.
2 Bandow, Doug. “Foreign Aid: Help or Hindrance?” Freedom Daily. 1998. The Future of Freedom Foundation. 12 May 2005 .
3 “Bangladesh and Featured Topic: Aid.” 13 May 2005 .
4 “Banglapedia: Development Finance.” 13 May 2005 .
5 Brazier, Chris. “Building up the Poor or Reinforcing Inequality?” The New Internationalist. 2001. 13 May 2005 .
6 “Country Analysis: Bangladesh.” 2004. Energy InformationAdministration. 12 May 2005 .
7 “Foreign Aid to Bangladesh.” 14 May 2005 .
8 Jahan, Rounaq, et al. “Bangladesh: Promise and Performance.” New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2001.
9 Majewski, John. “Third World Development: Foreign Aid or Free Trade.” The Freeman. 1987. The Foundation for Economic Education. 14 May 2005 .
10 Rahn, Richard W. “Turn Off Foreign Aid?” The Washington Times. 2003. The Cato Institute. 13 May 2005 .
11 “Independent Review of Bangladesh’s Development”. Revisiting Foreign Aid. 2003. Center for Policy Dialogue Bangladesh. 13 May 2005 .
12 Scott, Michael. “Aid to Bangladesh: For Better or Worse?” San Francisco: Oxfam-America, 1979.
13 Shah, Anup. “Sustainable Development: The US and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Global Issues. 1998. 12 May 2005 .
14 Srinivas, Hari. “Grameen Bank: Banking on the Poor”. Grameen Support Group. 2004. The Global Development Research Center. 13 May 2005 .