There have been several recent shifts in the types of immigrants arriving in Italy, leading to concerns that Italy’s social and economic infrastructure will be unable to cope effectively with integration. First, the majority of immigrants no longer come from countries with which Italy has a "privileged relationship" -- such as its former colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia -- but also from unexpected sources such as East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Further, immigration of females with the purpose of joining the labor force rather than simply joining their families has increased. Finally, while seasonal immigration is still common, immigration has become increasingly popular as a permanent move rather than one with the sole purpose of saving money and returning home. As a result, the imperative nature of integration is becoming increasingly evident.
After making the transition to a receiving state, Italy adopted a dual policy of restricting immigration while promoting integration. Italy’s first major policy response to increasing immigration was the Martelli Law, passed in 1990. The primary result of this law was to establish amnesty dates on which illegal immigrants could present themselves and receive legal status within Italy. The aim of this law was to mimic the system that France carried out in 1980 and 1981 to reduce illegal immigration and thus improve the integration of those within its borders; this is particularly important in Italy, given its flourishing black market. However, only about ten percent of illegal immigrants came forward, and about 50 percent of immigrants living in Italy today are there illegally. Another point of the Martelli Law concerning integration was to articulate immigrant rights. It guarantees all immigrants "equality of treatment and full equality of rights to the use of social and health services...to the maintenance of cultural identity, to schooling and to the availability of housing" (Collinson, 98). Long after this piece of legislation was passed, however, integration enforcement remained poor. The majority of implementation was left up to local authorities, many of whom neglected to recognize the law at all. This was particularly prevalent in the prosperous north of Italy where racist and anti-immigration views remain widespread.
The next and most prominent step concerning integration policy came in 1998 with creation of the Turco-Napolitano Law. This piece of legislation, passed under a center-left government, focused primarily on immigration policy, but also addressed the broad goal of decreasing discrimination while searching for feasible means of integration. Articles 43 and 44 allowed legal immigrants full rights and illegal immigrants, basic rights. However, the law also contained several discriminatory clauses, such as its creation of temporary housing centers designed for captured illegal immigrants. In January of 2004, Doctors Without Borders published a report stating that the conditions of these centers are unacceptable under any human rights legislation. This is a clear reflection of Italy’s recent governing coalition’s negative stance toward immigrant human rights despite the legislation it has passed. While the Turco-Napolitano Law served as a first step, its vague provisions required more specific legislation to clarify specific goals. Just after it was passed, therefore, a three-year document for migration policies was created to point out short-term goals. The true result of the process was to create a new document equally as vague as the previous; it stated, "The experience carried out in many other European countries suggests creating a balance between the tendency to universalize rights and the recognition of existing differences, pointing out integration models of foreign citizens ... respectful of cultural and religious differences" (Campani, 3). Suggested areas on which to focus included the need for living quarters for newcomers, support to foreign associations and meeting space, counseling on health concerns, training mediators and promotion of intercultural activities within schools. However, primary power to implement the ideas embodied in the document was again given to regional governments; in fact, they received over 80 percent of the budget. In doing so, the Italian government enabled local governments to decide how significant they wanted integration to be. Further, in 1998 the government created the Commission for the Integration of immigrants in Italy to study the issue. Its final report insisted "that the economy needs immigrants" but also mentioned the high drop-out and failure rates of immigrants in the school system. It confirmed that many immigrants arrive in Italy in good health only to have it quickly deteriorate due to poor living and working conditions. Finally, it admitted that immigrants commit a disproportionately high number of crimes, but also that they do so because of conditions into which the lack of integration forces them. While the Commission collected a great deal of data, the ultimate report reflected the policies of a center-left government hoping to improve integration while fearing a loss of popularity among the anti-immigration population.
Following this report a new piece of legislation was passed in July of 2002 called the Bossi-Fini Law. Passed by the new administration comprised of a coalition of members from parties on the right, the law created significantly stricter controls on immigration by dramatically reducing the cases where it was possible to obtain family reunion, increasing the period of residence required for a non- EU citizen to qualify for a residence permit, and requiring that all immigrants entering the country be fingerprinted. Again, however, the legislation addressed integration only to a limited extent. The most prominent -- and contentious -- aspect of the integration policies contained in the law made gaining a residence permit and its duration strictly dependent on the possession of a working contract and an employer willing to provide living accommodations. If an immigrant were to lose his job and not find another within six months, he would be forced from the country. According to Vittorio Agnoletto, a current member of the European Parliament, "The link between a job and a residency permit puts the lives of the immigrants completely in the hands of their employers" In this sense, it is quite easy for employers to exploit immigrants. This decreases the prospect of healthy integration into the workforce.
Despite the creation of legislation -- although minimal -- aiming to facilitate integration, Italy faces many challenges when it comes to integration. Of particular prominence is the recent shift from a center-left government to one leaning right. The intolerant attitudes of the current leading coalition, led by Premier Silvio Berlusconi of the Forza Italia party but which also includes the more radical Northern League and the National Alliance, are evident in the tighter restrictions placed on immigration and integration in the Bossi-Fini Law. In addition, one of the most problematic aspects of immigration policy in Italy is the relative ease with which immigrants can enter the country illegally due to its long coastal borders. Berlusconi’s official stance on integration is that in conjunction with limiting illegal immigration, immigrant quotas should be introduced to ensure that the number of immigrants does not exceed Italy’s ability to integrate them. While stemming illegal immigration is certainly a legitimate cause and is in part responding to requests from other EU countries, the way in which the administration has approached the topic has been particularly insensitive. In fact, in June of 2003, Umberto Bossi, leader of the populist Northern League party responded to illegal immigration from north Africa by means of boat as saying "There are two ways to apply a law: either our boats will confront the clandestine immigrants coming ashore . . . or you write in black and white that our force must be used. After the second or third warning, boom. . . fire the cannon. Don’t talk too much" (Spillman, Agence France Presse, 1). While this statement evoked outrage from many Italians, it nevertheless reflects the attitudes of those recently in office, which in turn reflect the attitudes of those who elected them.
Within this political atmosphere, integration is becoming increasingly difficult. In fact, in a study on discrimination and racism in Italy from 2000- 2002 by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, the authors conclude, "Most of the Italian political world is incapable of understanding that in a society where there are population groups which have no rights or have clearly different rights, even if they have been regular residents for a long time, democracy itself and even coexistence are in danger" (Rivera, 4). The ultimate conclusions of this study were that the existing laws concerning integration are not satisfactory and further, that even the minimal legislation that does outlaw discrimination is not adequately enforced. However, it is possible that prospects for integration are improving; in 2004, immigrants in Rome were given the right to elect city representatives. While those elected cannot vote in the city council, many see this as a step toward giving non-Italians a greater say in Italian affairs. This is a first step toward further integrating them into society. France's history of immigrant integration is significantly longer than that of Italy’s. It has been a principal receiver of immigrants in Western Europe for two centuries; in fact, one million foreigners already inhabited France by the beginning of the twentieth century. Particularly during the World Wars, France strongly encouraged immigration to make up for the lost workers serving in the army. The 1970s were a crucial turning point in the immigration policies of France, however. Ultimately, in 1974 France suspended further recruitment of foreign workers. At this point there were approximately 3.4 million foreigners living in France. Following the ban halting the immigrant recruitment, immigration within France shifted dramatically. Family reunions replaced the flow of labor recruits, and France’s loss of colonies led to a dramatic increase in both immigrants and French citizens from North Africa.
Until this point, the French model of integration was one of secularism which emphasized the policy of "assimilate or return". However, the government did little to facilitate this assimilation; according to Collinson, "although the assimilation of immigrants was expressed as an ultimate goal it was assumed or hoped that this would come about automatically if immigrants were forced to address existing traditional French institutions" (92). In this sense, the government encouraged assimilation, but assumed that if it took steps to forcefully improve the situation of immigrants it would inhibit them from truly assimilating. Ultimately, the principle upon which France’s integration policies were based was that people should be judged based on their competency rather than their background.
This policy was not particularly effective, thus toward the end of the 1970s the assimilation model lost its appeal and was replaced by a more open integration model encouraging limited ties to the culture of origin. This is the model on which Italy’s policy is based, although not well-enforced. The first years of François Mitterrand’s socialist government in the early 1980s shifted the focus from immigration restrictions to human rights and cultural pluralism. In fact, he even stated that he was open to extending local voting rights to foreigners. However, while this was recently achieved in Italy, it has yet to take place in France. Then in 1989 and 1990 alone, measures taken at state level included the creation of an Interministerial Committee for Integration, the reinstatement of the National Council for Immigrant Populations, and the creation of a Council for Reflection on Islam in France. By creating these organizations, the government increased public recognition of integration, and placed all aspects of integration under its control in hopes of increasing efficiency. Further, as with the current stance of the Berlusconi administration, the emphasis was placed on limiting illegal immigration with the goal of improving integration of immigrants already within France. Like Italy, France encouraged illegal immigrants to present themselves with the understanding that they would be granted legality. As with Italy, the unintended result was an increase in illegal immigration.
Another step toward integration in France that is strikingly similar to that in Italy was the report created by the Commission on Nationality in 1987. This step was echoed by Italy ten years later, with both reports focusing on what still needed to be done concerning integration in their respective countries. The ultimate goal of the report was to foster and formalize the process of "Francization" and the resulting assimilation of immigrants into the dominant cultural frame of France. While the report spent considerable time addressing the failure of the French school systems for immigrants, the primary emphasis was placed on the imperative nature of language skills for immigrants if they were truly to be successfully integrated. Ultimately, it stated "Linguistic integration is one of the main challenges of naturalization because language is the carrier of France’s common culture" (Archibald, 31). As a result, it recommended that applicants for immigration be evaluated based on their use and knowledge of the French language, involvement in the socioeconomic life of the nation, and academic records.
The decade of the 1990s was primarily shaped by a reassertion of the assimilation model. The High Council on Integration, created by Prime Minister Michel Rocard in March 1990, produced three reports from 1991-92. The reports virtually eliminated the concept of the multiracial and multiethnic society, ending nearly 20 years of promoting such concepts. Specifically, one report stated "the logic of equality among citizens must prevail over that of protection and special treatment of minorities" (Fassman, Wenden, 76). This focus on integration was coupled with a strong campaign against discrimination launched in 1999. As in Italy, at this point much of the responsibility for implementing integration was shifted to local governments. Yet unlike in Italy, this has become increasingly Coordinated by the national government in the past two years to improve implementation.
Since the start of the new millennium, France has made a conscious effort to improve its integration policies. Policies of positive discrimination (affirmative action in the United States) remain adamantly opposed by Chirac and many French inhabitants, as they contradict France’s notion of a homogenous, egalitarian republic. Nevertheless, the French government has taken active steps to target "disadvantaged groups" such as the chronically unemployed, disabled, and single parents. Frequently, these groups are comprised of disproportionately high levels of immigrants. In addition, in January 2004 Chirac appointed an immigrant Muslim, Aiessa Dermouche, to be a prefect -- one of the state’s top administrative jobs -- for the first time. However, tensions over Muslim integration sharpened when Dermouche’s parked car was destroyed by an explosion only a week after his appointment.
Further, in 2003 President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Minister of Social Affairs Francois Fillon, and Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, introduced a new three-pronged approach to integration: a revised integration plan, a proactive campaign against discrimination, and a more open but still highly selective immigration policy. The plan detailed a new "integration contract" to be forged with recent immigrants guaranteeing extensive language classes and civic education by the state, as well as regular meetings with a tutor to facilitate access to social services. Ultimately, Raffarin stated that the aim of the program was to "set the social escalator in motion" by offering better access to education, training, and jobs (Financial Times, April 10, 2003). While the new program is not mandatory, strong incentives for complying are given, such as ten-year rather than one-year residence permits. Overall, what this plan in fact represents is an increased government dedication to provide the services it has promised immigrants since 1993. To finance the plan, the government cut funding for many associations focused on retaining native cultures, causing hundreds to disappear. This plan addresses many of the same issues that Italy faces concerning integration. However, unlike Italy, France has taken a more proactive stance and formed a plan to deal with these issues. Despite these recent measures to improve integration, France still faces many obstacles. As with Italy, racism is particularly prevalent among the French population. In fact, according to a survey carried out on behalf of the European Commission in 1998 in all member countries, there exist strong feelings of distance and hostility towards non-Europeans in France (Body-Gendrot, 8). A more recent reflection of this is the strong showing of the far right party the National Front in the June 2002 elections. Racism is particularly targeted against segments of the population whose presence evokes a conflict-ridden past, such as the immigrants from Maghreb. Anti-Semitism, too, has a long history in France and has increased recently with many violent attacks carried out by Muslims. In fact, from October 1-18 in 2000, six synagogues were burned down and another 24 synagogues were targets of attempted arson. While these acts are not supported by the majority of Muslims within the country, they still damage their societal status and reflect concerns of increasing radicalization.
Integration failures are also highlighted in French systems of education, housing and employment. Many inhabitants of the worst housing areas are foreign, and they are more likely to face discrimination when searching for housing. Further, the percentage of unemployed and unskilled workers is much higher among foreigners than among the native French. The education system also faces challenges, as foreign children are less likely to pursue higher education. The emphasis on secularization in the education system was recently brought to an extreme when the government banned headscarfs -- traditionally worn by Muslim women -- in schools. This step has evoked widespread criticism, yet according to polls it is also supported by a majority of France’s Muslim population. Even despite these problems, however, France remains ahead of Italy in terms of integration; immigrants in Italy face similar problems, but these problems are much less widely recognized.
While it may not appear so at first glance, there are some areas in which the immigrant integration into French society has been quite successful. When children of immigrants had to manifest the desire to become French when applying for French nationality, the overwhelming majority did so (they now acquire it automatically at 18, assuming they have lived in the country for five years). Further, according to the 1999 census, 9.6 percent of all marriages in France were comprised of one person with French roots and one foreigner. Finally, an extensive study prepared for the conference "European Societies of European Society" in 1999 found that children of immigrants are equally successful than those of natives when from the same social background and family environment (Vallet, 1). The cases of Italy and France are particularly fascinating from a comparative perspective as a result of the fact that France has a long history of integration policy while Italy has just begun to struggle with it in the past few years. In this sense, Italy has taken many cues from France’s integration strategy while still developing distinct policies tailored to its own needs. Like France, Italy is attempting to limit illegal immigration to better integrate its current immigrant population. Also like France, Italy attempted to accomplish this through declaring amnesty days on which illegal immigrants were guaranteed legality if they came forward. In both countries, this primarily served to increase illegal immigration. Also like in Italy, France had a period in which integration was primarily left up to regional authorities. This is no longer the case in France, however, while it still remains so in Italy. Also similar to the two cases was the creation of a commission to investigate integration policy, as a lack of integration in both countries was overwhelmingly evident. Discrimination and racism are also at the heart of this issue in both countries. One way in which Italy has just recently taken a step ahead of France is that it has granted voting rights to foreigners in local elections. Those elected have no voting power, yet this still represents a positive step in increasing representation of Italy’s immigrants.
While there are clear similarities between France and Italy’s systems of integration, as a whole they remain quite different. Italy is significantly farther behind France when it comes to recognizing the necessity of integration because this is an issue that has only very recently become evident within its borders. This is reflected in the fact that, until 1986, there was virtually no legislation concerning immigration at all, and the first piece of legislation addressing integration was not created until 1998. Even despite this legislation, in many ways it appears as if the inhabitants of Italy are not yet willing to accept that immigration will be a permanent phenomenon. Italy’s formal policies have focused more on respecting diversity than France’s, yet in practice cultural diversity has not been celebrated on a wide scale throughout Italy. This is coupled with the fact that the few integration policies that exist have been poorly implemented and enforced, partially as a result of the power of regional authorities when it comes to integration. Further, the racist tone of Italy’s previous governing coalition has done little to improve the enforcement of integration policies, and through the Bossi-Fini Law has even created a system in which immigrants are totally dependent on their employer for their livelihood. As a result of this widespread racism, a leading Italian demographic expert, Massimo Livi Bacci, cites France’s racism and immigrant isolation as a primary concern of Italy; he states, "In France, some young people in the second generation have become part of the Casseurs (literally, "breakers" or very violent groups), and we should try to avoid this" (ANSA, 1). This statement highlights the prevalent racism and the ways in which Italy can use the failures of the French integration system to improve its own policies.
Recent events, both in these countries and in the world, have led to an increasing necessity of successful integration. Of particular concern is the rising threat of terrorism, as evident in the September 11 attacks. While terrorism was an issue facing Europe long before September 11, the increasing violence of some of France’s Muslim population has led to concerns of radicalization. Many worry that France’s system of integration, with its staunch opposition to forced integration through positive discrimination, has ultimately led to an isolated and underprivileged immigrant population. France has responded to these events in a stronger fashion than Italy through its new campaign against discrimination and the increased power of national rather than local authorities when it comes to implementing integration. Italy’s reaction has been much less concrete, both as a result of the previous governing coalition and because integration is not yet ingrained in its socioeconomic infrastructure. Because of increasing Europeanization, immigrant integration is becoming more pressing as an issue for all member states. Movement between member states is simple, thus it is in the best interests of all member states to foster inclusiveness and fight against radicalization. As a result, common principles for integrating immigrants were agreed at a Council of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers meeting on November 19, 2004. While it was stressed that member states retain the authority to formulate their own policies, this remains a historic step toward encouraging better integration in all EU countries. Among the 11 principles set forth in the document were the necessity for a basic respect for EU values as well as cultural and religious diversity, the recommendation that immigrants be allowed to vote and join political parties "wherever possible," the obligation of immigrants to know the host country’s language, and the need for non-discriminatory immigrant access to employment, housing, and public services. All of these clauses -- with the exception of voting -- have been put into formal legislation in both France and Italy. However, their enforcement in Italy has been questionable.
Immigrant integration is a challenge that is faced by all members of the EU to varying degrees. France has been grappling with integration for decades and has focused primarily on an egalitarian system of secularism. Rather than highlight the differences of immigrants, France in theory chooses instead to present all inhabitants with the same opportunities. Unfortunately, this system has not been entirely successful and has contributed to the growth of the far right, grave intolerance, and even racial violence. Italy faces similar problems, particularly given its previous governing coalition, yet because integration is such a recent issue in Italy it has not yet received the same amount of attention as in France. France has responded accordingly in the past few months, announcing a new plan of integration in conjunction with a campaign against discrimination and racism. Italy has not responded as strongly as a result of its government and the youth of its integration policies. This is an issue that needs development in both countries for the sake of Europe’s security, rich cultures, and economic prosperity.
Becky Farmer is a senior international relations major from Newton, Massachusetts.